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ABSTRACT 
 
This study carefully explores how the established relationship among environmental performance, 
environmental strategy, and financial performance matters across heterogeneously performing 
groups. For this purpose, we employ a sample of companies operating in heavy polluting 
industries in the United States from 1991 to 2005. The result showed that the relationship between 
these variables definitely varies across different levels of environmentally performing groups, 
such as best, moderate, and worst performing, suggesting that strategic decision makers and 
public policymakers alike need to be careful not to make easy conclusions: proactive (reactive) 
environmental strategy leads to better (poorer) environmental performance, and doing well 
necessarily results in doing good.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
his paper sets out to advance our understanding of the established relationship between environmental 
performance (EP), environmental strategy (ES), and financial performance (FP). The question is how 
the effect of ES and FP on EP varies across heterogeneously performing groups such as best, 
moderate, and worst environmentally performing groups (hereafter, BEP, MEP, and WEP, respectively) given the 
variety of industries within our sample in which heterogeneity seems quite likely. Circa 2014, heterogeneity does 
not appear to have been rigorously explored within the EP literature since Hart and Ahuja (1996), who reported that 
FP varied substantially between firms with small and large toxic releases (TR)—a common measure of EP. We view 
the issue of heterogeneity as a pragmatic concern that bears closely on the integrity of research on EP. 
 
Broadly defined, our focus on EP as a dependent variable and ES and FP as independent variables is 
consistent with existing studies: the relationship between ES and EP (Hart, 1995; Hunt and Auster, 1990; Klassen 
and McLaughlin, 1996; McGuire, Sundgren, and Schneeweis, 1988) and the relationship between EP and FP 
(Ambec and Lanoie, 2008; Fernando, Sharfman, and Uysal, 2009; Hart and Ahuja, 1996; Nehrt, 1998; Russo and 
Fouts, 1997; Sharma, 2002; Walley and Whitehead, 1994).  
 
Concerning the ES and EP linkage, the natural resource-based view (NRBV) argues that a corporate 
competitive advantage results from the environmental perspective (e.g., reducing harm to the natural environment) 
(Hart, 1995; Hart & Dowell, 2011). Accordingly, this perspective continues to examine whether ES influences EP. 
The NRBV argues that firms adopting a proactive environmental strategy may contribute to a significant 
improvement in the environment footprint, whereas firms with a reactive environmental strategy may worsen the 
natural environment.  
 
The existing literature continuously asks, “Is doing well doing good?” With respect to the sign of the 
relationship between EP and FP, the majority of the research argued that EP is positively correlated with FP (Dixon-
Fowler, Slater, Johnson, and Ellstrand, 2009; Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh, 2007; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes, 
T 
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2003). The argument is that proactive steps to improve EP reduce the need to address pollution, emissions, and 
waste and, in turn, improve process efficiency, productivity, and innovation-offsetting effects (Buysse and Verbeke, 
2003; Hart and Ahuja, 1996; Judge and Douglas, 1998; Porter and van der Linde, 1995). In contrast, some 
researchers argued that EP is either non-significantly or negatively correlated with FP (Friedman, 1970; Freedman 
and Jaggi, 1994; Greer and Bruno, 1996; Lothe, Myrtveit, and Trapani, 1999; Walley and Whitehead, 1994). This 
opposite perspective contends that corporate investments to reduce environmental impact exceed the benefits. 
 
More rigorous research was called for to explicate the relationship in question (Dixon-Fowler et al., 2009; 
Margolis et al., 2007). We suggest that some of the confusion previously alluded to is the result of the character of 
the particular samples studied in the literature. That is, we posit that the samples are likely to be heterogeneous from 
one another and that untested heterogeneity may have existed within the samples employed. 
 
We attempt to explore how the established relationship between environmental performance, 
environmental strategy, and financial performance matters across heterogeneously performing groups, which is a 
largely overlooked but fundamental issue of heterogeneity within the sample. The theoretical development is beyond 
the scope of this research because the relationship in question has been well established in the existing literature. 
Rather, this study applies the established theoretical arguments of the literature to further understand the 
heterogeneity across groups that perform differently. In the next sections, we briefly discuss the literature, introduce 
the hypotheses, explain our methods, and reveal our results, implications, and concluding remarks.  
 
2. LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
 
2.1. Environmental Performance And Environmental Strategy 
 
Environmental performance is measured by the impact of a firm’s decisions on the natural environment, 
i.e., greenhouse gas emissions and raw material and energy usage, and fines paid (Lyon and Van Hoff, 2009). EP 
may also be indirectly measured by checking archived newspapers and databases. We use the output measure of 
toxic releases (TR) as reported in the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s toxic releases inventory (EPA TRI). 
Previous research extensively used this data source because these data allow a consistent comparison of 
environmental performance between U.S. firms over time (Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel, 2009; Delmas and Blass, 
2010). Regardless of the definition, as noted in the introduction, researchers contended that EP is definitely 
influenced by corporate ES. 
 
ES, a primary independent variable in this study, directs action at the interface of organizations and the 
natural environment (Sharma, 2000). According to the NRBV (Hart, 1995; Hart and Ahuja, 1996), economic 
performance is determined by a firm’s ability to reduce its environmental impact (e.g., eliminating or reducing waste 
and pollution) by committing to optimal environmental strategies. Corporate sustainable growth rests on its ability to 
leverage emerging environmental opportunities.  
 
Such emerging opportunities cause a firm to adopt a wide range of ES from simply complying with current 
regulations for voluntary actions that capitalize on newly generated opportunities to reduce and avoid threats, 
whether competitive or regulatory (Dahlmann, 2009; Post, Preston, and Sauter-Sachs, 2002; Sharma, 2000). 
Generally, ES is regarded as one way to develop a competitive advantage (Hart, 1995; Mitchell, Agle, and Wood, 
1997; Porter, 2006; Post et al., 2002; Sharma and Henriques, 2005).  
 
Specifically, Dahlmann (2009) dichotomized ES, through which legislative compliance is labeled 
“reactive” and voluntary action is labeled “proactive.” The reactive ES includes less active environmental initiatives, 
such as “pollution control” or “regulatory compliance,” whereas proactive ES includes voluntary environmental 
initiatives such as “pollution prevention,” “product stewardship,” and “sustainable development” (Sharma and 
Henriques, 2005; Sharma and Vredenburgh, 1998). This study applies such a dichotomous classification for easy 
comparison and then explores the heterogeneous nature of the ES and EP relationship across groups that perform 
differently.  
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In particular, this study employs Kinder Lydenberg Domini (KLD) environmental indicators as proxies for 
each type of ES. The current KLD environment section encompasses fourteen dichotomous variables, including 
seven strength and seven concern factors. The seven concern factors include “Hazardous waste,” “Regulatory 
problems,” “Ozone-depleting chemicals,” “Substantial emissions,” “Agricultural chemicals,” “Climate change,” and 
“Other concerns” (visit www.kld.com for additional details). These factors are all recognizable as consequences of 
actions not taken in advance to prevent pollution from being emitted into the natural environment. These ex post 
facto actions are clearly indicative of the implicit adoption of a reactive corporate strategy. Reactive ES is achieved 
using end-of-pipe methods (Hart, 1995; Porter and Van der Linde, 1995) and requires almost no involvement from 
top management and no company-wide employee training (Henriques and Sadorsky, 1999).  
 
The seven KLD strength factors consist of “Beneficial products and services,” “Pollution prevention,” 
“Recycling,” “Clean energy,” “Communities,” “Property/plant/equipment,” and “Other strengths.” These actions are 
taken in advance to prevent pollution problems, are directed toward a corporate end, and are representative of 
strategies directed toward environmental performance and a proactive strategy. Proactive ES demands efforts to 
increase resource productivity, material substitutions, innovative manufacturing processes (e.g., to conserve energy) 
and new products (e.g., 100% recyclable), and technology innovations and substitutions, and probably requires the 
collaboration and involvement of many stakeholders; the strategy emphasizes preventing problems rather than 
cleaning up messes (Hart, 1995; Sharma, 2000), such as those exemplified in the Gulf of Mexico by British 
Petroleum (BP) and its contractors (i.e., Transocean and Halliburton) in April 2010.  
 
As previously mentioned, the NRBV argues that firms adopting a proactive ES may contribute to a 
significant improvement in the environmental footprint, whereas ones with a reactive ES may worsen the natural 
environment. The literate still makes a rigorous call for examining whether the effect of ES on EP is heterogeneous. 
 
2.2. Environmental Performance And Financial Performance  
 
The environmental sustainability literature has continuously debated the relationship between EP and FP 
(Ambec and Lanoie, 2008; Fernando et al., 2009; Hart, 1995; Hart and Ahuja, 1996; Hunt and Auster, 1990; Klassen 
and McLaughlin, 1996; McGuire et al., 1988; Nehrt, 1998; Russo and Fouts, 1997; Sharma, 2002; Walley and 
Whitehead, 1994). If doing well (in financial performance) is positively related to doing good (to the natural 
environment), firms are able to legitimize their expensive environmental practices. Concerning the relationship 
between EP and FP, the majority of the research argues that financial investments in improved EP reduce the need 
for management to deal with pollution, emissions, and waste materials, and to create beneficial relationships with 
many of the firm’s external stakeholders (Buysse and Verbeke, 2003; Hart and Ahuja, 1996; Judge and Douglas, 
1998). Thus, the research holds that EP is positively correlated with FP (Dixon-Fowler et al., 2009; Orlitzky et al., 
2003). Some counterpart researchers argued that EP is either insignificantly or negatively related to FP ( Folger and 
Nutt, 1975; Freeman and Jaggi, 1994; Friedman, 1970; Greer and Bruno, 1996; Lothe et al., 1999; Walley and 
Whitehead, 1994). They contended that investments to reduce the environmental impact exceed the benefits. Again, 
this study attempts to empirically investigate whether the relationship between EP and FP differs across 
heterogeneously performing groups rather than to develop a theoretical contribution. 
 
For another set of independent FP variables that explain EP, this study applies earnings before interest and 
tax (EBIT/Sales) as a short-term FP measure and market/book value as a long-term FP measure. The former is an 
operating performance measure and is largely unaffected by the firm’s capital structures. The latter is focused on the 
market value of equity interests.  
 
2.3. Heterogeneous Groups—Best, Moderate, And Worst 
 
To carefully explore our primary question—the potential confusing effect of unappreciated heterogeneity—
we analyze our hypotheses by classifying firms into best-, moderate-, and worst-performing groups using a 
“corporate environmental performance index (CEPI).” CEPI is computed for firm i in industry k at time t (Hart and 
Ahuja, 1995; Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; Pogutz and Russo, 2009) as follows:  
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where TRit represents the total toxic releases of firm i in a given year t and Sit represents the total sales of firm i in a 
given year t. Total toxic releases in a given year t are first standardized over firm total sales in the same year (Hart 
and Ahuja, 1995), and then the standardized TR is normalized by calculating the ratio between TR/Sales and the 
industry k average TR/Sales (Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996).  
 
A firm with CEPI of “one” emits the same toxic releases per dollar as its industry rivals. CEPI lower 
(higher) than “one” indicates that the company’s EP is better (worse) than its industry’s average. We took the ln 
transformation of all CEPI values to correct for skewness and to control for outliers. Given the fact that CEPI ranges 
from a minimum of 0.2 to a maximum of 1.9, we created three peer groups with approximately equal numbers of 
firms but with different levels of environmental performance. A firm’s CEPI index between 0.2 and 0.9 deems the 
firm to be in the best-performing group, between 0.9 and 1.1 deems the firm to be in the median-performing group 
(and its CEPI is similar to the industry average), and between 1.1 and 1.9 deems the firm to be in the worst-
performing group. 
 
2.4. Research Questions About Heterogeneity 
 
Hart and Ahuja (1996) showed that better EP was more strongly correlated with higher return on sales and 
return on equity for firms with high emissions levels than for firms with low emissions levels (p. 34). Accordingly, 
we admit that confirming and investigating the practical importance of empirically meaningful heterogeneity across 
differently environmentally performing groups is worthwhile. However, existing studies did not rigorously test 
heterogeneity. Moreover, prior studies implicitly assumed homogeneity to enable the researchers to implicitly 
assume the unrecognized risk that their results could be misleading. 
 
For example, Figure 1 provides doable evidence for our heterogeneity test in which Nucor’s toxic 
releases/sales ratio rises and falls twice during the observation period, whereas Merck’s decreases almost 
monotonically over time. Throughout the 2000–2005 period, Nucor expanded substantially primarily through 
acquisitions and a substantial number of these transactions were forward integrated into downstream facilities 
known as “Building Systems,” with manufacturing essentially “fabrication” and not emitting heavy pollution. 
However, the different levels of TR revealed are prime facie evidence that heterogeneity could be an important 
characteristic of our data. Without a heterogeneity test, accepting the established general conclusion of “doing good 
is doing better” is difficult.  
 
Again, this study applies the established arguments instead of developing a new theory. The fundamental 
question based on the existing arguments is whether the relationship between EP, ES, and FP differs across 
environmentally best-, moderate-, and worst-performing groups. Without additional explanations, we develop the 
following hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between ES and EP differs across groups that perform heterogeneously in 
environmental performance. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between FP and EP differs across groups that perform heterogeneously in 
environmental performance. 
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Toxic Releases/Sales of Nucor 
 
 
Toxic Releases/Sales of Merck 
 
 
Figure 1: Ratio Of Toxic Releases (Lbs) To Sales Over Time At Nucor And Merck 
 
3. METHODS AND SAMPLE 
 
3.1. Sample And Data Source 
 
This study uses one longitudinal file integrated from three separate databases, including EPA TRI for EP, 
KLD for ES, and Compustat North America (CNA) for both FP and control variables. Next, we introduce each of 
the separate databases. 
 
3.2. Toxic Releases Inventory (TRI)  
 
Since 1988, the EPA has reported TRI data for more than 23,000 corporate facilities. Measuring EP may 
encompass monitoring greenhouse gas emissions and raw material and energy usage. As previously noted, our 
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choice is to use EPA TRI data. The output-based toxic releases are characterized by “relevance,” “accuracy,” 
“comparability,” and “availability” and “measurability” (Pogutz and Russo, 2009). Before matching TRI data with 
KLD and CNA, we used consistent identifiers and aggregated the toxic releases at the separate facilities level to the 
firm level. 
 
3.3. Kinder Lydenberg Domini (KLD)  
 
The KLD database has been widely used to measure corporate social responsibility and environmental 
management (Chatterji et al., 2009; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Mattingly and Berman, 2006; Rehbein, Waddock, and 
Graves, 2004). Since 1991, KLD set out to report approximately 650 firms, and it has expanded, since 2003, to 
cover 3,100 firms. KLD uses company name, ticker, and CUSIP as identifiers and generates approximately 80 
ratings as “concern” and “strength” factors at the end of each calendar year. These categories well represent 
corporate social activities (Berman, Wicks, Kotha, and Jones, 1999; Chatterji et al., 2009; Hillman and Keim, 2001). 
For our research purpose, we use only 14 environmental factors (seven strengths and seven concerns). We 
eliminated a few factors because of “not available” and “not related” records. For example, of the seven 
environmental strength factors, “Communication” has only been recorded since 2005 (the end of the observation 
period for our study), no scores are assigned for “Property, plant, and equipment,” and “other strengths” is rarely 
observed. Likewise, among seven environmental concern scores, “Climate change” and “Other concerns” are not 
recorded for many cases. Therefore, we were unable to use all seven concerns and seven strengths. 
 
3.4. Financial Performance And Control Variables 
 
From CNA data, we employ FP and control variables. We measure two FP variables: an accounting-based 
measure (EBIT/Sales) as a proxy for short-term FP and market/book value as a proxy for long-term FP. In addition, 
this study incorporates the following control variables: firm size, diversification, capital expenditures (CAPX), 
slack, industry, and economic conditions. With respect to size, firm size matters in the ES and EP relationship 
(Hillman and Keim, 2001; Waddock and Graves, 1997). One argument is that large firms have the discretionary 
resources needed to mitigate environmental problems; the other argument is that small firms are more flexible and 
quicker to respond to environmental demands (Bowen, 2002). Our study uses the 4
th
 root of assets as a proxy for 
firm size to control for outliers and to resolve a collinearity problem.  
 
Concerning diversification, some argued that as firms diversify, management pays more attention to the 
social reputation of every operating unit (Dixon-Fowler et al., 2009; Fombrun, 1996), striving for better EP. In 
contrast, as diversification increases, governance issues arise that present management with difficulties in 
maintaining control, which increases the cost of coordination and results in EP possibly suffering. By applying 
standard industry classification (SIC) codes and then counting the number of three-digit industries in which a firm in 
the same two-digit industry code is doing business during a specific year (Caves, Porter, and Spence, 1980; 
Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988), we measure the degree of diversification of a firm at a given time. The current 
data show that firms are active in a minimum of one and a maximum of 11 industries at the three-digit code level. 
 
We added capital expenditures (i.e., CAPX/Sales) as a further control because American manufacturers 
were spending approximately 20% of their capital budget on emissions compliance (Hart and Ahuja, 1996). If such 
investments have continued, CAPX/Sales should be negatively correlated with TR on a consistent basis over time, 
thus increasing EP. 
 
We also control a carefully selected set of commonly used organizational slack, such as available slack 
(current assets/current liabilities), potential slack (debt/equity), and recoverable slack (SGA/Sales) (Bourgeois, 
1981; Bourgeois and Singh, 1983). That slack resources provide managerial discretion is well known. Therefore, 
these three measures as financial buffering may influence EP.  
 
Industry is another control (Margolis et al., 2007; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000). The preliminary analysis 
shows that the average toxic releases of the so-called business-to-consumer (B2C) industries (NAICS 31) are less 
than that of other industries (the B2Bs) for the entire observation period. B2C firms may be more susceptible to 
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stakeholder pressure than B2B firms because of their broader visibility (Fombrun, 1996; Strike, Gao, and Bansal, 
2006).  
 
The economic environment is the last control and is represented by the Misery Index (i.e., unemployment 
rate + inflation rate). We expect that management is likely to give limited attention to EP during difficult periods 
and when the index is high because EP strives to bolster its short-term financial performance. 
 
3.5. Integration Of KLD, TRI, And CNA   
 
First, because KLD, TRI, and CNA have been compiled in different ways, we manually checked identifiers 
to establish that the same company simultaneously existed in the different data sets. Second, we set KLD as the 
primary reference group because it covers the smallest number of firms and started reporting data for the latest year, 
1991. Accordingly, we set 1991 as the beginning of the observation period (so-called left-censoring), as Allison 
(1984) defined. We set 2005 as the end of the observation period (right-censoring) because we could only complete 
the TRI data set until 2005 when we began our research in early 2009. Unknowingly, at that time, this constraint 
allowed us to avoid including a strong effect of recent events – the 2008 and 2009 financial sector collapse and the 
almost concurrent U.S. recession – into the model. Finally, we arbitrarily selected a few firms and checked whether 
the aggregation was accurate. 
 
3.6. Environmental Performance (Toxic Releases, TR) Model 
 
The specific purpose of this study is to assess whether the effects of ES and FP on TR – a proxy for EP – 
differ across heterogeneously performing groups in environmental performance. To investigate this relationship, we 
use an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation on the following model: 
 
TRi,t = F(1ESi,t + 2 FPi,t + 3 Control variablest +  i,t)         
 
where: TR = Ln-transformed total toxic releases (unit: lbs) in year t; 
 
ES = proactive and reactive environmental strategy (strength and concern scores) in year t; 
FP = EBIT/Sales as a short-term FP proxy and market/book value as a long-term FP proxy for FP 
variables that were mean-centered to control for industry effect; and, 
control variables = firm size (fourth root of assets), diversification, mean-centered slack (available, 
potential, and recoverable), CAPX/Sales, the misery index, and a dummy for the industry sector (B2C). 
 
3.7. Statistical Methods 
 
The sample is comprised of unbalanced cross-sectional panel data. Fundamental to the analysis of panel 
data is the choice of an estimator. We used a fixed effect (FE) model after applying a Hausman post-estimation test 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). The FE model admits that, “regressors are endogenous provided they are correlated 
only with a time-invariant component of the error” (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, p. 236). This method assumes that 
regressors (i.e., Xi) are correlated with the individual related effects (i.e., i) and allows for the effective control of 
fixed effects, providing consistent parameter estimates in the cross-sectional panel data.  
 
3.8. Testing for heterogeneity
 
 
 
Again, the primary question is whether the effects of ES and FP on EP differ across environmentally best-, 
moderate-, and worst-performing groups. To address this question, we applied a CHOW test (Chow, 1960; Lo and 
Newey, 1983) using the STATA “difference” formula, which allows us to directly ascertain whether ES and FP have 
different effects on EP in each group and whether each group has its own intercept.  
 
y1 = x1*b1 + u1 (equation for BEP group) 
y2 = x2*b2 + u2 (equation for MEP group) 
y3 = x3*b3 + u3 (equation for WEP group) 
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The question is whether or not b1 = b2 = b3. To compare these three groups within the same model, we 
combined the data describing the separate groups into a single pooled data set: 
 
y = d1* (x1*b1 + u1) + d2* (x2*b2 + u2) + d3* (x3*b3 + u3) 
 
In this equation, y is the set of all outcomes; d1 equals 1 when the data are for the better performing group 
and 0 otherwise, d2 equals 1 when the data are for the moderately performing group and 0 otherwise, and d3 equals 
1 when the data are for worse performing group and 0 otherwise.  
 
4. RESULTS 
 
Table 1, descriptive statistics, provides means, standard deviations, and ranges for our variables. Table 2, 
the correlation table, includes all variables in question except for the dummy variable (i.e., industry). Table 3 
presents four sets of results: the results of the undifferentiated full population and the CHOW tests for our three 
heterogeneous environmental performance groups. The model used in each of the four regressions is identical except 
for the sample size. Note that TR is the dependent variable, a proxy for inverse EP; that is, a larger TR indicates 
worse EP, whereas a smaller TR indicates better EP.  
 
First, the full population model in column 3 is representative of the common practice in environmental 
sustainability studies. The next three columns are the heterogeneity tests – the real focus of this research – and 
represent a step that contributes to the literature. The different patterns of the significant results of the CHOW test 
across the three differently performing peer groups make clear that we accept our hypotheses about heterogeneity. 
Clearly, the effects of heterogeneity are substantial across the peer groups at a significant level of the model (i.e., F-
value). The implication of these results is that, with respect to environmental policy, one policy for all industries is 
unlikely to be effective. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Category Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
KLD  
concern  
factors 
Hazardous waste 1,231 .4143 .4928 0 1 
Regulatory problems 1,231 .4362 .4961 0 1 
Ozone depleting chemicals 1,231 .0390 .1937 0 1 
Agricultural chemicals 1,231 .0967 .2956 0 1 
KLD  
strength  
factors 
Beneficial products/services 1,231 .1552 .3622 0 1 
Pollution prevention 1,231 .1243 .3300 0 1 
Recycling 1,231 .1113 .3146 0 1 
Clean energy 1,231 .0861 .2806 0 1 
Environmental 
performance 
Ln toxic releases (Unit: lbs) 1,231 505,149 17.53 14.99 567,669,533 
Financial 
performance 
EBIT/Sales 1,231 .1125 .0829 –.2772 .5750 
Market/Book value 1,231 3.3602 7.5982 –105.221 110.942 
Control 
variables 
Available  
(current asset/current liabilities) 
1,231 1.6014 .7794 .3852 16.7814 
Potential  
(debt/equity) 
1,231 1.2136 2.2536 .0022 37.1926 
Recoverable  
(SGA/Sales) 
1,220 .1673 .1233 .0033 .6431 
Firm size (Unit: million dollars 
in assets) 
1,231 5,874.5 3.72 178 304,592.5 
Diversification 1,231 2.6872 1.8890 1 11 
CAPX/Sales 1,231 .0792 .1221 .0067 1.9988 
Misery index  
(inflation + unemployment rate) 
1,231 8.2526 1.2486 6.05 11.1 
Note: Although KLD reports seven concerns and seven strengths, we report only five concerns and four strengths because some 
are “not available” or “not related.” 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix (* p<0.5) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 1         
2 .2112* 1        
3 .0947* .0598* 1       
4 .1546* .1335* .4879* 1      
5 –.1782* –.2096* –.0516 –.0870* 1     
6 .1080* .0609* –.0123 .0767* –.0730* 1    
7 –.1193* –.0404 –.0579* –.1070* –.1160* –.0629* 1   
8 .0828* .0511 .0429 .1054* .0640* .0599* –.1086* 1  
9 –.2025* –.0516 .0234 –.0367 .0946* .0128 .0082 –.0648* 1 
10 .0238 .0667* –.0497 –.0449 –.0609* –.0764* .0419 –.0612* –.1007* 
11 –.1352* –.2151* –.0105 .0218 .1341* .1116* –.1433* –.0321 .0432 
12 –.1081* –.1870* .0315 .0611* –.0403 .0682* –.0713* –.0573* –.0648* 
13 –.0823* –.0078 –.0084 .0151 –.0283 .0130 –.0290 –.0250 –.0618* 
14 .2489* .2607* .1698* .1478* –.2857* .1062* .1347* –.1126* –.0390 
15 .4339* .2292* .0989* .0959* –.2744* .1951* –.0035 .1064* –.2907* 
16 –.0923* –.0916* –.0156 .0034 –.0680* –.0701* –.0431 .3285* –.0648* 
17 .0065 .0472 .0282 .0142 –.0258 –.0174 .0589* .0885* .0205 
18 .1507* .0130 .2023* .0687* .0448 .3024* .0354 .0432 –.0659* 
 
Table 2 continued 
 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
10 1        
11 –.0908* 1       
12 –.1063* .4332* 1      
13 .2101* .1810* .2068* 1     
14 .0450 –.1543* .0178 –.0025 1    
15 .1917* .0066 .1754* .0641* .4032* 1   
16 –.0628 –.0928* .2786* –.0134 –.1647* –.0359 1  
17 –.0514* –.0033 –.0930* –.0639* –.0532 –.1089* .0296 1 
18 –.0114 –.0634* –.0469 –.0228 .2923* .3274* –.1237* .0005 
(1) Hazardous waste, (2) Regulatory problems, (3) Ozone depleting chemicals, (4) Agriculture chemicals, (5) Beneficial products 
and services, (6) Pollution prevention, (7) Recycling, (8) Clean energy, (9) Available slack, (10) Potential slack, (11) 
Recoverable slack, (12) EBIT/Sales, (13) Market value/Book value, (14) Ln toxic releases, (15) fourth root of assets, (16) 
CAPX/Sales, (17) Misery index, (18) Diversification 
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Table 3: Heterogeneity Test 
Ind. Variables DV: Ln TR Full Model Best Performing 
Median 
Performing 
Worst 
Performing 
KLD 
concern 
factors 
Hazardous 
waste 
.1067 (.1077) .2727† (.1419) .0361 (.1248) .2621† (.1474) 
Regulatory 
problems 
.1357† (.0807) .5237***(.1356) .1161 (.0915) –.0447 (.1174) 
Ozone 
depleting 
chemicals 
.2609 (.3517) –1.7262 (.8715) .8812** (.3151) –.4959 (.3790) 
Agriculture 
chemicals 
.0509 (.1913) .0458 (.2977) –.3460 (.1895) .7776* (.2722) 
KLD strength 
factors 
Beneficial  
products/ 
services 
–.3030* (.1468) –.6199***(.1614) –.0541 (.1488) –.3456 (.3005) 
Pollution  
prevention 
.1536  (.1136) –.2029 (.1626) .2544† (.1328) –.1184 (.1648) 
Recycling –.0040 (.1754) .2551 (.2339) –.0925 (.2134) –.0777 (.1972) 
Clean energy .0439 (.1414) .1188 (.1779) –.0204 (.1570) .3316 (.2840) 
Financial 
performance 
EBIT/Sales .5613 (.6123) –.6552 (.7332) .6672 (1.0434) .7631 (1.1200) 
Market/Book 
value 
–.0031 (.0047) –.0390*** (.0095) .0465*** (.0110) .0388**(.0125) 
 
Control 
variables 
Available 
slack 
.2624**(.0877) .3506** (.1257) –.2709†(.1503) –.2481 (.1680) 
Potential slack –.0362 (.0609) .0269 (.0879) –.0416 (.1011) –.2488*(.1234) 
Recoverable 
slack 
–1.0557 (.7834) –1.4409† (.8520) –1.1590 (.7687) –.4011 (.9945) 
CAPX/Sales –1.5483**(.4401) –1.3228** (.4087) 1.3682 (.9785) –.1609 (.8151) 
Firm size  
(4th root of 
assets) 
–.0764*  (.0358) .1022** (.0375) .0169 (.0333) –.0363 (.0540) 
Diversificatio
n 
.1947*** (.0511) .2831***(.0560) –.1837***(.0460) –.1342*(.0578) 
B2C –1.1311* (.5302) –1.6815***(.5411) –.3714 (.3798) Dropped 
Misery index .0590* (.0240) –.1161* (.0432) .1627** (.0516) .1436** (.0538) 
Obs.  1211 315 496 388 
F-Value  6.61*** 4.83*** 2.84*** 3.82*** 
R-square  0.1069 0.2744 0.1223 0.1970 
* p< 0.05; ** p< 0.01; *** p<0.001; † p<0.1; the result of the separate model including only total concern and strength scores will 
be provided on request. Numbers in parentheses are the “standard error.” 
 
With respect to the results for the individual ES proxies
1
 and FP in the three EP groups, a variety of 
significant results was observed across heterogeneous groups. With respect to both “Beneficial products and 
services” as a proxy for proactive ES and “Regulatory problems” as a proxy for reactive ES, and for many of the 
control variables, the results of the full population model are more similar to the results of the BEP group. 
Nonetheless, we still observe heterogeneity across differently performing peer groups. 
 
By starting with the individual KLD concerns, we interpret the group results that focus on a single 
independent variable at a time to explain the heterogeneous effects of ES and FP on EP. First, a larger variety of 
                                                 
1 Existing empirical studies commonly used total concern scores (i.e., the arithmetic summation of concern scores in a given year, TC) and total 
strength scores (i.e., the arithmetic summation of strength scores in a given year, TS) as proxies for ES. However, the preliminary correlation test 
makes clear that total concerns are negatively and significantly correlated (r = –.0822) with total strengths at p < .05, suggesting that total 
concerns and total strengths are almost orthogonal. Thus, the use of simple arithmetic summation may be based on a weak foundation. In 
addition, we found low + and – correlations across specific strength and concern factors, implying that any variables created by simply summing 
KLD concerns or strengths may not be appropriate proxies for ES (Mattingly and Berman, 2006). To extend the existing research, this study 
employed individual KLD factors as alternative proxies for ES. We also used total concern and strength scores in a separate regression model to 
compare with models that include alternative individual KLD factors. The results from the preliminary regression and CHOW tests show that 
neither TC nor TS was significant for either the full population or BEP and WEP groups. These results will be provided on request. 
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significant concerns exists across the three heterogeneous groups than in the full population. For example, 
“hazardous waste” is of no importance in the full model but is marginally significant and positive for both the BEP 
and WEP groups as expected, implying that more waste leads to poor EP.  
 
“Regulatory problems” is significant only for the full model and the BEP group. Therefore, firms with 
better EP experience have fewer regulatory problems; that is, firms in the BEP group emit smaller TR than those in 
the counterpart peer groups. That this statement is not true for the MEP and WEP groups given their demonstrably 
weaker EP is surprising. That “Regulatory problems” for these two groups has no significant coefficients may be the 
result of the absolute level of their EP being so weak that new regulatory problems have no differential effects in 
these peer groups. 
 
“Ozone depleting chemicals” and “Agricultural chemicals” are each significant and positive for the MEP 
group but not for the other peer groups. “Agricultural chemicals” are positively significant only in the WEP group. 
These results may be characteristic of the industries represented, which represent particular policy problems for 
regulators. 
 
We turn to individual strength factors. The results show that little variety exists across heterogeneous peer 
groups. “Beneficial products and services” is negatively significant for the full sample and for the BEP group. 
Ceteris paribus, because of its negative coefficient, BPS appears to offset the positively signed significant concern, 
“Regulatory problems,” for that peer group. The marginal effect of BPS is larger in the BEP group than in the full 
sample model. This result confirms the potential power of proactive environmentally friendly innovation 
championed by Porter and van der Linde (1995) and Hart and Ahuja (1996) for the best environmentally performing 
companies. 
 
However, other strength factors are not significant in either the full model or any of the three heterogeneous 
groups. To our surprise, a marginal but odd positive coefficient exists for “Pollution prevention” for the MEP group, 
which is contrary to our expectations. This odd result may be explained from the correlation results. Although 
concern factors are positively correlated with one another (i.e., they show the expected consistent sign), strength 
factors are positively and negatively correlated with one another. This finding suggests that, compared with the 
relationships among concern factors, strength factors assumably contradict one another, indicating that the effect of 
individual ES on EP may be insignificant and less consistent across heterogeneous groups. This result probably 
warrants further research to overcome the basic limitation of KLD binary data. 
 
The results for the two financial performance variables are very interesting, in part because many hope to 
prove “doing good by doing well.” First, Table 3 clearly shows that no significant correlation exists between TR and 
EBIT/Sales, a result that contradicts expectations but that is robust given that it is true for each of the three groups. 
At least in the industries studied in this paper, we may conclude that the state-of-the-art with respect to TR 
management is advanced enough that no immediate earnings are incurred in attempting to manage TR levels. In 
practice, after the EPA was established under Nixon in 1970, the United States has been paying attention to better 
TR management for a long time. The EPA has made efforts to improve air quality, and it announced in its 2010 
report that air pollutants declined by approximately 41% between 1990 and 2010. 
 
Unlike the absence of significant results with respect to short-term FP, the long-run FP, market/book value, 
has good and bad results. Market value is the “price per share” at year-end and is compared with the year-end book 
value. Price is volatile. However, because our study period was curtailed in 2005, it is not largely affected by the 
financial crises of the post-2007 era, slightly facilitating interpretation. 
 
The results show that TR is negatively correlated with long-run financial performance for the BEP group, 
suggesting that—at least for the BEP group—doing good is well rewarded in the long run. These results imply that 
better EP is correlated with higher stock appreciation. However, these results also show an unexpected finding that 
market/book value is significantly positively associated with TR (i.e., worse EP) for the MEP and WEP groups. 
These unexpected results may suggest that doing well in long-run FP does not guarantee doing better for the natural 
environment, at least for the MEP and WEP groups. That is, firms at least in these two groups seem to attempt to 
enhance long-run financial performance at the cost of good citizens. In addition, these findings provide evidence for 
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why we cannot ignore a study of group heterogeneity because the full model may mask the hidden true meaning of 
subgroups.  
 
Practically, these results also lead to an important corporate and public policy issue. In other words, public 
policy makers and NGO leaders in particular may find these last results disturbing because they point to a divorce of 
a large sector of the polluting industries in the United States from well-intentioned efforts to create an 
environmentally sustainable industrial base. For the MEP and WEP groups—perhaps more likely to be “Ozone 
depleting chemicals” or “Agricultural chemicals” manufacturers—the positive correlation between long-run 
financial benefit and effective TR signals that efforts to improve EP and reduce TR are very likely worse and are 
judged by the capital markets as wasteful. For these groups, a higher market-to-book value is correlated with larger 
TR (i.e., poor EP). For emphasis, we note that the capital market seems to recognize that persisting with or accepting 
poor EP is a legitimate financially rewarding strategy for companies in these peer groups. 
 
Our results for the MEP and WEP groups point to a policy failure, possibly at the EPA in past years, 
because the strategies pursued by the agency appear to work only with the best and not with the rest. 
 
We turn to the control variables to complete this discussion. The results show that the control variables are 
remarkably replete with significant coefficients. First, CAPX clearly has a significant negative effect on TR in the 
BEP group, although the effect on the margin is slightly smaller than in the full model. That is, compared with MEP 
and WEP groups, the BEP group may be boosting its TR performance as it expands and renews its plants. As Hart 
and Ahuja (1996) argued, advancing technology may still contribute to both enhanced productivity (its primary or 
motivating casus belli) and better EP. Again, the MEP peer group apparently has not been as successful in killing 
two birds with one stone. 
 
Firm size has a positive effect on TR only in the BEP group. This result points to a need to carefully 
evaluate the effectiveness of present day public policies across industries for which size itself is one of the variables 
of interest. The correlations identified for the BEP peer group suggest that large firms may be dragging their feet 
with respect to improving EP. Diversification has similar results with respect to TR in the BEP group as in the full 
model, but is negatively correlated with TR for both the MEP and the WEP groups.  
 
We included three types of slack variables. The result shows that available slack is significantly correlated 
with TR. However, the positive relationship implies that having available (idle) resources may be dysfunctional for 
the BEP group (and in the full model). The marginal effect for the BEP group is considerably greater than for the 
full model probably because of the masking effect of the other two groups in the control population. The negative 
and significant results for potential slack for the WEP group offer some hope for policy makers looking for ways to 
encourage better EP, to enforce corporate efforts, or at least whom to audit carefully. The results suggest a further 
need for discrimination at a public policy level when dealing with rules and enforcement for firms in the WEP 
group. Firms with substantial potential slack may be proving more capable and willing to enhance their TR 
performance than their financially more conservative peers. Firms not using their debt capacity appear to be the 
laggards. 
 
B2C is significant and negative in the full model and only for the BEP group of subgroups, another result 
that supports our contention that heterogeneity matters. Note that a study of the full sample masks the real effects 
within these industries. Also interesting is the set of results associated with the Misery index in Table 3, which 
seems to show that, from 1991 to 2005, only the BEP group had the capability to weather the tough high misery 
years and reduce its TR impacts.  
 
5. DISCUSSION 
 
Guided by the arguments and questions raised by existing research, this study attempted to answer a recent 
emerging call for heterogeneity by carefully investigating how the effects of ES and FP on EP differ across 
heterogeneously performing groups in environmental performance. Prior literature relied almost exclusively on 
cross-sectional or qualitative studies (Strike et al., 2006), whereas this study was based on longitudinal cross-
The Journal of Applied Business Research – January/February 2015 Volume 31, Number 1 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 159 The Clute Institute 
sectional panel data encompassing three databases. Moreover, we were able to carefully control for several firm 
attributes, industry, and government administration periods.  
 
To compare the recently recommended method with the common practice (i.e., total scores) for using KLD 
factors, this study employed individual KLD factors. As previously mentioned, total concern and strength scores 
may not be valid measures because they are orthogonally correlated with one another. The heterogeneity test 
provides evidence for the argument that simply aggregating orthogonal factors may mask the hidden true meanings 
in subgroups and then mislead to confuse the results (Mattingly and Berman, 2006). In contrast, the results for the 
individual KLD measures are informing and, in some instances, encouraging for policy makers. For example, the 
particular ES measures, either reactive or proactive, are at least generally consistent with the theory for the BEP 
group, although mostly inconsistent with the theory for the rest.  
 
Low correlations between KLD concern and strength factors suggest that researchers need to be careful in 
attributing significant weight to the effects of the sums of total concerns or strengths on EP (Mattingly and Berman, 
2006; Chatterji et al, 2009). Our heterogeneity test also suggests that caution is warranted when researchers use 
separate KLD concerns and strengths as ES proxies unless they confirmed that the sample used is homogeneous. 
Specifically, the CHOW tests show that recognized heterogeneity gives us the opportunity to more closely 
appreciate the effects of ES and FP on EP within an industry population. These results also suggest a more exact 
appreciation of the impacts and failures of TR management, both corporately and publically through regulation and 
its enforcement. These matters are of considerable importance in a world in which environmental concerns are being 
translated into legislation.  
 
Generally, this study’s results for the BEP group were more consistent with prior research than those for 
either the MEP or the WEP peer groups. A possible explanation to consider for a moment is that firms in an 
environmentally better performing group are more likely to report their ES and EP exactly to the TRI record keepers 
than firms in environmentally worse or moderately performing groups. However, the different signs and sizes of the 
coefficients for the control factors in every group argue against this proposition. Perhaps, over time, improved and 
wider scoped data collection practices at KLD will assist in resolving these questions. 
 
Our results may have additional implications. According to “neoinstitutional theory,” firms imitate what 
they see in similar firms’ traits and outcomes (Haveman, 1993; Lee and Pennings, 2002). Firms tend to adopt 
practices or structures adopted by leading firms (Haunschild and Miner, 1997) and tend to imitate other firms in 
their industry that are perceived as successful (Burns and Wholey, 1993). Firms are always interested in best 
practices among their peers; therefore, determining the firms to imitate matters. Our results suggest that, with respect 
to EP and efforts to improve their own EP, firms need to learn how to constructively discriminate—they need to 
understand the groups in which they belong and the effects of alternate strategies on the particular EP they seek to 
effect. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
This study confirms that the relationship between ES and EP differs across heterogeneously performing 
groups, along with the effect of FP, suggesting that past research needs to be carefully reassessed if homogeneity 
was implicitly assumed across industries. Thus far, in EP studies, normal practice has been to assume homogeneity 
across the researched population. Regardless of common practice, the evidence presented is that, with respect to 
environmental policy, one policy does not fit all because the populations of many industries are demonstrably 
heterogeneous and their EP is subject to quite different effects from strategic choices, financial tradeoffs made, size, 
and even conditions prevailing in the economic environment of the U.S. This study is to alert others working in the 
EP domain of the risks attendant to unrecognized heterogeneity. Indeed, in any study on mixed populations, 
researchers must test for heterogeneity. Clearly, much remains to be learned about the factors that shape EP in the 
U.S. economy and the effectiveness of public policy in the environmental domain. 
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